The Conflict Surrounding The Producer Distributor
Relationship Requirement
Of The Publicity Proviso by unknown
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 39 | Issue 4 Article 15
Fall 9-1-1982
The Conflict Surrounding The Producer
Distributor Relationship Requirement Of The
Publicity Proviso
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
The Conflict Surrounding The Producer Distributor Relationship Requirement Of The Publicity Proviso, 39
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1533 (1982), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol39/iss4/15
THE CONFLICT SURROUNDING THE PRODUCER-
DISTRIBUTOR RELATIONSHIP REQUIREMENT
OF THE PUBLICITY PROVISO
In section 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act (Act),' Congress
recognized a distinction between "primary" and "secondary" union ac-
tivity.2 Primary activity is conduct directly targeted at an employer who
is a party to the labor dispute with the union.' Secondary activity is con-
duct that attempts to influence employers not party to the labor
dispute.4 Section 8(b)(4) of the Act allows primary activity directed at an
employer involved in the labor dispute, but generally prohibits secon-
dary activity.' Since 1959, the publicity proviso to section 8(b)(4) of the
1 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976). Section 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act pro-
vides that it is an unfair labor practice for a labor union:
(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person
... to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to... per-
form any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in
commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object
thereof is
(B) forcing or requiring any person ... to cease doing business with any other per-
son....
Id.
, Id.; see NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 50 (1964) (quoting Local 1976,
Carpenter's Union v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 98 (1958)). Congress sought to limit union pressure
on neutral employers that had no direct dispute with the union by enacting § 8(b)(4). See
NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1964);
Note, Picketing And Publicity Under Section 8(b)(4) of the LMRA, 73 YALE L.J. 1265,
1265-66 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Picketing]; Comment, Publicity Under Section 8(b)(4) of
the Labor-Management Reporting And Disclosure Act, 80 DICK. L. REV. 768, 768 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Publicity]. Section 8(b)(4) restricts only union activity that targets
employers not party to the primary labor dispute. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976). The sec-
tion does not prohibit primary activity by the union against the employer directly involved
in the union's labor dispute. See id.
, See NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen Local 760, 377 U.S. 58,
80 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Strikes, boycotts, picketing, and other activities designed
to bring pressure on an employer with whom a union has a dispute are forms of primary ac-
tivity. See Comment, Unions, Conglomerates, And Secondary Activity Under The NLRA,
129 U. PA. L. REV. 221, 221 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Unions].
See NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehouseman Local 760, 377 U.S. 58,
80 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Section 8(b)(4) prohibits union activity that is calculated to
coerce companies not directly involved in the labor dispute to cease doing business with the
employer involved in the union's labor dispute. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976). Section
8(b)(4) reinforces the public policy that employers not involved directly in a labor dispute
should have protection from coercive secondary activity and suffer only the incidental
pressure that the primary activity against another employer creates. See Engel, Secondary
Consumer Picketing-Following the Struck Product, 52 VA. L. REV. 189, 229-30 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Engel].
5 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976). Section 8(b)(4) prohibits all union secondary activity, ex-
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Act has exempted certain secondary union activity, other than
picketing, from the section's prohibition against secondary activity.' The
proviso allows publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of advis-
ing the public that a secondary employer" distributes products that a
primary employer' produces as long as the publicity does not induce any
secondary employee to refuse to perform duties of employment.9 The Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (Board) and the federal courts have re-
jected a literal interpretation of the producer-distributor language of the
publicity proviso.0 The Board and the federal courts, however, have
cept activity that the publicity proviso exempts from the section's prohibition. Id.; see note
2 supra; note 6 infra.
- 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976). The publicity proviso of § 8(b)(4) allows:
publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the public,
including consumers and members of a labor organization, that a product or pro-
ducts are produced by an employer with whom the labor organization has a
primary dispute and are distributed by another employer, as long as such publicity
does not have an effect of inducing any individual employed by any person other
than the primary employer in the course of his employment to refuse to pick up,
deliver, or transport any goods, or not to perform any services .... (Emphasis added).
Id.
Congress enacted the publicity proviso to protect a union's freedom to appeal directly
to the public and to avoid infringing on a union's freedom of speech. 105 CONG. REC. 16591
(1959); see NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 55 (1964); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v.
NLRB, 662 F.2d 264, 270 n.4 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3287 (U.S. Oct. 12,
1982) (No. 81-1985). Congress clearly intended to allow truthful appeals by unions to con-
sumers not to buy a manufacturer's goods. See Local 537, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Lohman
Sales Co.), 132 N.L.R.B. 901, 908, 48 L.R.R.M. 1429, 1432 (1961); 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976);
105 CONG. REC. 15906 (1959). The congressional sponsors of the publicity proviso wanted no
prohibition on truthful appeals to consumers not to buy goods in situations in which the
manufacturer of the goods is involved in a labor dispute. 105 CONG. REC. 15906 (1959). Some
parts of the legislative history of the proviso arguably indicate that Congress sought to pro-
tect all union informational activity short of picketing, even though the language of the pro-
viso limits the type of publicity exempted from the prohibition in § 8(b)(4). See id. at 16414;
29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1976). Senator John F. Kennedy commented during congressional
deliberations concerning the publicity proviso, a "union shall be free to conduct informa-
tional activity short of picketing." See 105 CONG. REC. 16414 (1959). Kennedy continued,
stating that a "union can carry on all publicity short of having ambulatory picketing" at a
secondary site. Id. at 17898-99. Kennedy, however, prefaced his comments with statements
indicating that he was thinking of publicity in a manufacturer-retailer situation. See id.
' A secondary employer is an employer not involved directly in a labor dispute. See
Publicity, supra note 2, at 768 n.1.
' A primary employer is the employer with whom a union has a labor dispute. See
NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 52-53 (1964).
9 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976); see note 6 supra.
"I See, e.g., NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 55-56 (1964) (producer given broader
meaning than manufacturer and processor); Edward W. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 662 F.2d
264, 269 (4th Cir. 1981) (language not read literally but broadly construed); Pet, Inc. v.
NLRB, 641 F.2d 545, 548 (8th Cir. 1981) (producer given broader meaning than manufacturer
or processor); Local 537, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Lohman Sales Co.), 132 N.L.R.B. 901,
906-07, 48 L.R.R.M. 1429, 1432 (1961) (finding wholesaler producer of products distributed).
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adopted potentially conflicting constructions of the producer-distributor
requirement of the publicity proviso.1'
In Lohman Sales Co.," the National Labor Relations Board found
that a striking union's distribution of handbills in front of stores carry-
ing products Lohman, the primary employer, distributed was protected
activity. The handbills advised customers of a strike with Lohman and
requested that the public not purchase the products that Lohman
distributed." The Board found that Lohman, as a wholesale distributor,
added labor in the form of capital, enterprise, and service to the product
and, therefore, was a "producer" of goods distributed by the handbilled
stores within the meaning of the publicity proviso." The Board asserted
that the proviso attaches no special importance to one form of labor over
any other.'5 The Board consistently has applied the Lohman rationale in
decisions interpreting the proviso and has extended the rationale to in-
clude within the scope of "producer" if the proviso any primary
employer who performs a service for a secondary employer.'6
The United States Supreme Court approved the Board's broad inter-
pretation of the publicity proviso in NLRB v. Servette, Inc."' In
Servette, the Court considered whether the publicity proviso protected
union handbilling that urged a consumer boycott of retail stores carry-
ing products Servette distributed.8 The Court adopted Lohman Sales,
holding that products "produced by an employer" include products
" Compare Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 662 F.2d 264, 272 (4th Cir. 1981) (en-
forcing 252 N.L.R.B. 702, 106 L.R.R.M. 2310 (1980)) with Pet, Inc. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 545,
549-50 (8th Cir. 1981) (denying enforcement of 244 N.L.R.B. 96, 102 L.R.R.M. 1046 (1979)).
" Local 537, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Lohman Sales Co.), 132 N.L.R.B. 901, 48 L.R.R.M
1429 (1961); see Engel, supra note 4, at 223-24; Publicity, supra note 2, at 774-75; Unions,
supra note 3, at 224.
132 N.L.R.B. at 902, 48 L.R.R.M. at 1430-33.
" Id. at 907, 48 L.R.R.M. at 1432. The National Labor Relations Board determined that
the publicity proviso placed no special significance on an employer's position in the chain of
production. Id. at 907, 48 L.R.R.M. at 1430-33. The Board found no evidence of congressional
intent to permit publicity with respect to manufacturers of goods and not permit publicity
with respect to wholesalers of goods. Id. at 908, 48 L.R.R.M. at 1430-33.
" Id. at 908, 48 L.R.R.M. at 132.
"s See, e.g., Local 712, IBEW (Golden Dawn Foods), 134 N.L.R.B. 812, 816, 49 L.R.R.M.
1220, 1221 (1961) (finding electrical and refrigeration services products within meaning of
proviso); Local 73, Elec. Workers (Northwestern Constr., Inc.), 134 N.L.R.B. 498, 500, 49
L.R.R.M. 1181, 1182 (1961) (publicity directed at employer furnishing construction services
protected by publicity proviso); Local 662, Radio & Television Eng'rs (Middle S. Broad-
casting Co.), 133 N.L.R.B. 1698, 1705, 49 L.R.R.M. 1042, 1046 (1961) (finding radio station
that added labor in services, enterprise, and capital to products is producer of products
advertised); Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 142 (Shop-Rite Foods, Inc.), 133 N.L.R.B. 307, 308,
48 L.R.R.M. 1638, 1639 (1961) (finding refrigeration installation services "product" within
meaning of proviso).
" 377 U.S. 46, 56 (1964). See generally Picketing, supra note 2, at 1270-73; Publicity,
supra note 2, at 777-78; Unions, supra note 3, at 224.
11 377 U.S. at 55-56.
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distributed by a wholesaler with whom the primary labor dispute
exists.'9 The Court found nothing in the legislative history of the proviso
to suggest that the publicity exemption was more narrow than the pro-
hibition of section 8(b)(4) against secondary activity." The Court's finding
arguably implied that all informational activity that the section other-
wise prohibited was protected.2 ' The Court, however, further com-
mented that Congress defined "produced" under the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act (FLSA) as "produced, manufactured, mined, or in any other
manner worked on .... '" The Court found that the FLSA definition of
"produced" clearly encompassed a wholesaler of goods such as Servette
and held that the publicity proviso protected the union publicity at
issue.2
The National Labor Relations Board and the federal courts have failed
to interpret the Supreme Court's Servette opinion uniformly. 4 Two re-
cent circuit court decisions illustrate the divergent approaches of inter-
preting the producer-distributor requirement of the publicity proviso.'
The Fourth Circuit adopted a broad construction of the proviso in Ed-
ward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB." In conflict with the Fourth Circuit's
19 Id.
" See id. at 55.
21 See id. Although the Supreme Court in Servette commented that nothing in the
legislative history of the publicity proviso suggest that Congress intended to make the pro-
tection of the proviso narrower than the prohibition of § 8(b)(4), the Court's comment should
be considered in conjunction with the facts and the other language of the Servette opinion.
See id. The Supreme Court did not abandon wholly the producer-distributor requirement
and thereby sanction all union publicity. See id. Instead, the Court considered the producer-
distributor language of the publicity proviso and found that Servette, a wholesaler of goods,
was a producer within the meaning of the proviso. Id. The Court's analysis in Servette
reveals that the Court was broadening the normal interpretation of "producer," rather than
holding that the proviso had no producer-distributor requirement. See id. But see Pet, Inc.
v. NLRB, 641 F.2d at 550-51 (McMillan, J., dissenting) (reading Servette interpretation of
publicity proviso as protecting any union publicity from prohibition of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)).
2 377 U.S. 46, 55 (1964) (construing 29 U.S.C. § 203(i) (1976)).
Id. at 55-56. The Supreme Court in Servette stated that courts considering the
FLSA definition of "produced" consistently have interpreted the definition to include
wholesale distribution of goods. Id. The Court also found that such an interpretation was
consistent with application of the term "production" in the War Labor Disputes Act. Id. at
56. Furthermore, the Court discounted the fact that Congress did not enact an alternative
version of the proviso that read "produced or distributed" since Congress never debated or
voted upon that version before approval of the enacted proviso. See id. at 56 n.15.
' Compare Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 662 F.2d 264,266-72 (4th Cir. 1981) (en-
forcing 252 N.L.R.B. 702 (1980)) and United Steelworkers (Pet, Inc.), 244 N.L.R.B. 96 (1979)
with Pet, Inc. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 545, 549-50 (8th Cir. 1981). See also Great W. Broadcasting
Corp. v. NLRB, 356 F.2d 431, 436 (9th Cir.) (radio station advertising products is producer of
those products); cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1002 (1966); Unions, supra note 3, at 229-36.
' See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 662 F.2d 264, 266-72 (4th Cir. 1981); Pet,
Inc. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 545, 549-50 (8th Cir. 1981).
662 F.2d 264, 268 (4th Cir. 1981).
1536 [Vol. 39:1533
PROD UCER-DISTRIB UTOR RELATIONSHIP
approach is the more narrow construction that the Eighth Circuit
adopted in Pet, Inc. v. NLRB.'
In DeBartolo, the Fourth Circuit refused to set aside an order of the
Board that dismissed a complaint of the Board's General Counsel." The
complaint alleged that a union's handbilling urged a secondary boycott
in violation of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act.29
The union handbilling at issue in DeBartolo urged a consumer boycott of
all stores located in a shopping mall that the Edward J. DeBartolo Cor-
poration operated." The DeBartolo Corporation leased a store site in the
mall to another corporation, the H. J. Wilson Company.3' Wilson con-
tracted with H. J. High Construction to build the store.2 The union's
dispute was with High.3 DeBartolo alleged that the handbilling con-
stituted coercion with the object of forcing DeBartolo to cease doing
business with Wilson and, therefore, violated section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the
Act.- The Board dismissed the complaint after determining that the
handbilling fell within the protection of the publicity proviso. 5 DeBar-
tolo petitioned the Fourth Circuit to set aside the dismissal, contending
that the publicity proviso should not protect the handbilling because the
required producer-distributor relationship did not exist between High
and DeBartolo, or between DeBartolo and the other stores at the mall.3
The Fourth Circuit upheld the Board's determination, ruling that the
symbiotic relationship between DeBartolo and the mall tenants sup-
ported the conclusion of the Board that the High-DeBartolo and High-
mall tenant relationships were that of producer and distributor. The
" 641 F.2d 545, 549-50 (8th Cir. 1981).
662 F.2d at 266.
2 Id.
Id. at 266-67.
a, Id. at 266.
3 Id. at 267.
" Id. at 266-67. The union in DeBartolo, the Florida Gulf Coast Building Trades Coun-
cil, sought to publicize its discontent with High's payment of wages and benefits that the
union felt inadequate. Id. The union did not picket but instead handed out handbills from
late 1979 until early 1980 when a Florida court issued an injunction halting the handbilling.
Id. at 267
1 Id. at 267; see note 1 supra.
3 662 F.2d at 267; see text accompanying notes 3-6 supra.
662 F.2d at 266, 268. DeBartolo argued that the union's handbilling violated § 8(b)(4)
of the National Labor Relations Act, not falling within the publicity proviso because the
handbills were untruthful. Id. at 267. The Fourth Circuit rejected DeBartolo's assertion. Id.
at 267-68.
, Id. at 269. The Fourth Circuit in DeBartolo concluded that the Board correctly inter-
preted the producer-distributor language of the publicity proviso as establishing a sym-
biotic relationship requirement. See id. The Board's novel interpretation of the proviso pro-
tects secondary publicity activity when the secondary party is in a mutually beneficial and
interdependent relationship with the primary employer. See id. at 268-69. The Fourth Cir-
cuit deferred to the Board's interpretation of the proviso's protection and application to the
1982] 1537
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Board found High a producer of the Wilson store because High, by its
labor, added value to the store. 8 The Board found High a producer of the
mall enterprise because in building the Wilson store, High applied
capital, enterprise, and service and thus, added value to the mall enter-
prise. 9 The Fourth Circuit asserted that the reasoning of the Board sug-
gested that both DeBartolo and the mall's tenants were distributors of
High's products."
In upholding the Board's decision, the Fourth Circuit relied upon
Lohman Sales, concluding that the term "produced" in the publicity pro-
viso meant adding the value of labor to goods in the form of capital,
enterprise, and service.41 Relying on Servette, the court adopted an ex-
pansive interpretation of the proviso.2 The court commented that liberal
interpretation of the proviso especially was necessary in situations in-
volving the construction industry because contractors literally do not
produce and distribute products. The court relied on several Board
decisions that found contractors "producers" of the end product to which
their services contributed." The Fourth Circuit further asserted that
the publicity proviso protected the handbilling at issue in DeBartolo
even though no direct producer-distributor connection existed between
the primary employer, High, and the handbilled employer, DeBartolo or
the mall tenants.
45
DeBartolo situation. See id. at 269. The Fourth Circuit determined that the Board's conclu-
sions on the interpretation and application of the producer-distributor language were ra-




o Id. The DeBartolo court reasoned that DeBartolo and the mall tenants distributed
the Wilson store and its inventory by attracting business, maintaining common areas, and
participating in joint advertising. Id. The court concluded that DeBartolo and the tenants
distributed the mall enterprise simply by conducting business. Id.
41 Id. See also Local-537, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Lohman Sales Co.), 132 N.L.R.B. 901,
907, 48 L.R.R.M. 1429, 1432 (1961).
"2 662 F.2d at 270 (citing NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 55 (1964)). The DeBartolo
court recognized the broad interpretation of the proviso that the Ninth Circuit adopted in
Great W. Broadcasting Corp. v. NLRB, 356 F.2d 434 (9th Cir.) (finding television station
advertising goods and services producer of those goods and services), cert denied, 384 U.S.
1002 (1966). 662 F.2d at 270.
662 F.2d at 270.
" Id.; see Local 712, IBEW (Golden Dawn Foods), 134 N.L.R.B. 812, 816, 49 L.R.R.M.
1220, 1221 (1961) (electrical and refrigeration services products within meaning of proviso);
Local 73, Elec. Workers (Northwestern Constr., Inc.), 134 N.L.R.B. 498, 500, 49 L.R.R.M.
1181, 1182 (1961) (publicity directed at employer furnishing construction services protected
by publicity proviso); Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 142 (Shop-Rite Foods, Inc.), 133 N.L.R.B.
307, 308, 48 L.R.R.M. 1638, 1639 (1961) (refrigeration installation servicies "product" within
meaning of proviso).
"5 662 F.2d at 271. The Fourth Circuit cited the Board's decision in Local 54, Sheet
Metal Workers (Sakowitz, Inc.), 174 N.L.R.B. 362, 70 L.R.R.M. 1215 (1969). 662 F.2d at 271.
In Sakowitz, a union involved in a labor dispute with an air conditioning and heating in-
staller distributed handbills advocating a consumer boycott of two companies that leased
1538 [Vol. 39:1533
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In concluding that the handbilling in DeBartolo met the producer-
distributor requirement of the publicity proviso, the Fourth Circuit ex-
pressly rejected the decision of the Eighth Circuit in Pet Inc. v. NLRB.46
In Pet, the Eighth Circuit reversed the Board's dismissal of a complaint
which alleged that a union had conducted an illegal secondary boycott by
distributing handbills and advertisements urging a boycott of all Pet
Products.47 The union conducting the publicity was involved in a primary
dispute with Hussman, a wholly owned subsidiary of Pet.4'8 The Pet court
found that Hussmann's only relevant connection to the Pet products
selected for boycott was through the corporate structure of Pet's con-
glomerate enterprise. 9 The court determined that Hussmann was essen-
tially autonomous and an independent business entity.0
stores using the installer's equipment and services. 174 N.L.R.B. at 362-63, 70 L.R.R.M. at
1216. The Board ruled that the publicity proviso of § 8(b)(4) protected the handbilling even
though the only primary-secondary contact was through the leasing of premises using the
primary's equipment. Id. at 362-64, 70 L.R.R.M. at 1217.
The Board ruled that the provision protected the publicity even if conducted at the
secondary employer's stores not using the primary's equipment. Id. at 364, 70 L.R.R.M. at
1217. The Board found nothing in the legislative history or language of the publicity proviso
indicating a geographic limitation on the scope of the proviso. Id. at 364, 70 L.R.R.M. at
1217. The Board in Sakowitz relied upon comments by Senator John F. Kennedy in the Con-
gressional Record that the publicity proviso would protect mass media publicity. Id. at 364,
70 L.R.R.M. at 1217; see 105 CONG. REC. 16414 (1959), note 6 supra. The Board asserted that
the absence of a geographic limitation on the scope of the publicity proviso was inherent in
Congress' intended protection of radio and newspaper advertising. 174 N.L.R.B. at 364, 70
L.R.R.M. at 1217. Congress, however, left unanswered whether mass media advertising
needed to target the secondary establishment where contact with the primary employer oc-
curred. See 105 CONG. REC. 16414 (1959). The Board in Sakowitz determined that the publicity
could target all locations where the secondary employer did business. 174 N.L.R.B. at 364,
70 L.R.R.M. at 1217.
6 See 662 F.2d at 271-72 (rejecting holding in Pet, Inc. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 545 (8th Cir.
1981)).
' 641 F.2d at 547, 550. See generally Unions, supra note 3, at 229-36.
641 F.2d at 546.
"See id. The Eighth Circuit apparently overlooked the fact that Hussmann had pro-
vided a division of Pet, 9-0-5 Stores, with refrigeration equipment. See id. at 547 n.2. The
General Counsel for the Board and Pet did not assert that the union publicity targeting 9-0-5
Stores violated § 8(b)(4) because 9-0-5 Stores was a distributor of the Hussman refrigeration.
See id.; United Steelworkers, 244 N.L.R.B. 96, 99 n.17, 102 L.R.R.M. 1046, 1048 n.17 (1979),
rev'd Pet, Inc. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 545 (1981). Arguably, both the Board and the Eighth Cir-
cuit committed error because neither considered the ramifications of the classification of
9-0-5 Stores as a distributor. If 9-0-5 Stores is i distributor of Hussmann refrigeration units,
then the proviso would protect activity against Pet, also a distributor. See note 79 infra
(discussion of ramifications of classifying 9-0-5 Stores as distributor of Hussmann refrigera-
tion).
. See 641 F.2d at 546. The Board in Pet carefully considered the corporate structure
of the Pet enterprise. See id. The Board found that Pet was divided into four groups, one of
which was Hussmann, that operate as independent business entities. Id. The Board em-
phasized that the divisions exercised complete authority over labor-relations and employ-
ment policies. Id. Each division could enter into collective-bargaining agreements without
the approval of Pet's corporate management. Id.
15391982]
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Reasoning that Hussmann was a producer of Pet products, the Board
in Pet found that the publicity proviso protected the union publicity.51
The Board characterized Hussmann as a producer because Hussmann ap-
plied capital, enterprise, and service to Pet.2 The Eighth Circuit
disagreed with the Board's characterization of Hussmann as a producer
of Pet products.5
The Eighth Circuit asserted that in Lohman Sales and Servette, the
Board correctly found the primary employer a producer because the
primary had direct involvement with products that the secondary
distributed. 4 The court found Hussmann's involvement with Pet's pro-
ducts highly attenuated.5 The court distinguished Servette, commenting
that Servette did not concern a case in which a subsidiary's products
were unrelated to a secondary-parent corporation's products. 6 The court
relied on the FLSA definition of "produced," as quoted in Servette, and
determined that Hussmann did not work on any Pet products. 7 The
51 Id. at 547, 549.
Id. at 549. The Board in Pet asserted that Hussmann contributed diversification,
profits, and goodwill to its parent corporation. Id. The Board determined that the contribu-
tions made Hussmann a producer under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the term
"producer" in Servette. Id.
53 Id.
" Id. The Pet court cited the Ninth Circuit's decision in Great W. Broadcasting Corp.
v. NLRB, 356 F.2d 434 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1002 (1966), for the proposition that
"producer" requires direct involvement of the primary with the secondary's product. 641
F.2d at 549. In Great Western Broadcasting Corp., the Ninth Circuit held that a television
station was a producer of all products the station advertised. 356 F.2d at 436. The Ninth Cir-
cuit found, therefore, that union publicity urging firms not to advertise on the station was
protected conduct under the publicity proviso. Id. The Ninth Circuit noted the analytical in-
congruity of regarding a television station as a producer of advertised products but deter-
mined that the Servette rationale considering distributors as producers should extend to
advertisers. Id. The Ninth Circuit determined that Servette required reliance upon the pro-
viso's legislative history and found no indication that Congress intended to differentiate be-
tween employers engaged in production and those providing services. Id.
The Eighth Circuit in Pet also noted the Board's decision in Local 662, Radio & Televi-
sion Eng'rs. (Middle S. Broadcasting Co.), 133 N.L.R.B. 1698, 49 L.R.R.M. 1042 (1961). 641
F.2d at 549 n.3. In Middle South Broadcasting Co., the Board applied the rationale that the
Ninth Circuit later adopted in Great Western Broadcasting Corp. and found a radio station
a producer of cars that the station advertised for an automobile dealer. 133 N.L.R.B. at
1705, 49 L.R.R.M. at 1043.
s 641 F.2d at 549. The Pet court found that if Pet were to sell Hussmann, its own
manufacturing, distributing, and promotion of products would be unaffected. Id. The court
determined that Hussmann was essentially independent from Pet. Id. Thus, Hussmann's in-
dependence from Pet let the court to find that no producer-distributor relationship existed
between the two companies. Id.
5' Id.
5 Id. The Pet court commented that the Board's interpretation of "produced" in the in-
stant case was at odds with any normal interpretation of the term. Id. The court, however,
did accept a broader than literal interpretation of "produced," as flowing from Lohman
Sales, Serve tte, and Great Western Broadcasting. Id. The court found that while "produced"
does not require manufacture or a form of physical creation, the term does require some
kind of work performed on a product of the secondary employer. Id.
1540 [Vol. 39:1533
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court held that the publicity proviso could not protect the union activity
because Hussmann in no way was a producer of the Pet products
selected for boycott.-8
Prior court and Board decisions, as well as legislative history, sup-
port the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of the publicity proviso. 9 Accord-
ing to the Board, the addition of labor is the prime requisite of a pro-
ducer. 0 The Board has interpreted producer to mean one who has ap-
plied labor in the form of capital, enterprise, and service to a secondary
employer's product." The Board has ruled that the publicity proviso
places no special importance on the type of labor that the primary
employer performs on the product."' Thus, the Board's analysis of the
publicity proviso supports a broad interpretation of produce that in-
cludes "abstract" forms of production such as distributing and advertis-
ing. 3 The analysis of the Board nevertheless traditionally has required
some form of work by the primary upon the product offered by the
secondary employer to the public for the primary's classification as a
"producer" under the proviso. 4 .
The Supreme Court in Servette followed the Board's original posi-
tion that a producer must apply labor in some form to a secondary
employer's product. 5 The Supreme Court's consideration of the meaning
of producer in the publicity proviso demonstrates that the Court was not
abandoning completely the producer-distributor requirement. Even
" Id.
" See NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 55 (1964); Great W. Broadcasting Corp. v.
NLRB, 356 F.2d 434, 436 (9th Cir. 1966); Local 537, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Lohman Sales
Co.), 132 N.L.R.B. 901, 907, 48 L.R.R.M. 1429, 1432 (1961); text accompanying notes 60-79 in-
fra.
, Local 537, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Lohman Sales Co.), 132 N.L.R.B. 901, 907, 48
L.R.R.M. 1429, 1432 (1961).
61 Id.
62 Id.
13See Local 662, Radio & Television Eng'rs. (Middle S. Broadcasting Co.), 133 N.L.R.B.
1698, 1705, 49 L.R.R.J. 1042, 1046 (1961); Local 537, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Lohman Sales
Co.), 132 N.L.R.B. 901, 907, 48 L.R.R.M. 1429, 1432 (1961).
" See, e.g., Great W. Broadcasting Corp. v. NLRB, 356 F.2d 434, 436 (1966) (television
advertising services by primary); Local 54, Sheet Metal Workers (Sakowitz, Inc.), 174
N.L.R.B. 362, 362-64, 70 L.R.R.M. 1215, 1216-17 (1969) (air conditioning contractors services);
Local 712, IBEW (Golden Dawn Foods), 134 N.L.R.B. 812, 816, 49 L.R.R.M. 1220, 1220 (1961)
(finding electrical and refrigeration services products within meaning of proviso); Local 73,
Elec. Workers (Northwestern Constr., Inc.), 134 N.L.R.B. 498, 500, 49 L.R.R.M. 1181, 1182
(1961) (publicity directed at employer furnishing construction services protected by proviso);
Local 662, Radio & Television Eng'rs (Middle S. Broadcasting Co.), 133 N.L.R.B. 1698, 1705
49 L.R.R.M. 1042, 1046 (1961) (radio station advertising products "producer"); Plumbers &
Pipefitters Local 142 (Shop-Rite Foods, Inc.), 133 N.L.R.B. 307, 308, 48 L.R.R.M. 1638, 1639
(1961) (refrigeration installation services "product" within meaning of proviso); Local 537,
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Lohman Sales Co.), 132 N.L.R.B. 901, 907, 48 L.R.R.M. 1429, 1432
(1961) (wholesale distribution services).
" See NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 55 (1964).
6 See id.
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though the Supreme Court commented that legislative history indicated
that the publicity exemption was as broad as the prohibition of section
8(b)(4), 7 the Court's comment should be considered in conjunction with
the Court's subsequent reliance on the FSLA, which defines "produced"
as "produced ... or in any other manner worked on.... "6 8 Because the
prohibition that section 8(b)(4) created places no special significance on
the form of production that an employer utilizes,69 dicta in the Supreme
Court's Servette opinion arguably supports a broad interpretation of the
producer-distributor requirement of the proviso that similarly places no
special signifiance on the type of production the primary employer per-
forms." A broad interpretation of the producer-distributor requirement,
however, does not remove the requirement from the proviso and,
thereby, sanction all union publicity activity.71 The Court simply extended
"production," as used in the proviso, to include abstract kinds of work
that a primary employer performs on a secondary's product." The
Supreme Court did not strike the producer-distributor requirement from
the proviso."
The Eighth Circuit in Pet found that the proviso offered the publicity
no protection from the prohibition of section 8(b)(4) of the Act because no
labor of Hussmann flowed through the Pet conglomerate enterprise into
the products that Pet distributed to the public.74 In Pet, the Board had
found that the primary, Hussmann, was a producer of Pet products even
though Hussmann's labor had no contact with Pet products. 5 The
Board's attempt to rationalize the interpretation of "produce" that re-
quires no contribution of labor was unconvincing since the Board's prior
decision in Lohman Sales had emphasized that the addition of labor is a
requisite ingredient of production.7 6 Application of capital, enterprise,
and service by Hussmann to the Pet enterprise without labor upon Pet's
products was insufficient to constitute "production" under the Lohman
7 See id.
See id. (construing 29 U.S.C. § 203(j) (1976)).
9 See Local 537, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Lohman Sales Co.), 132 N.L.R.B. 901, 907, 48
L.R.R.M. 1429, 1432 (1961) (construing prior version of 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976)).
70 See NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 55 (1964). The Supreme Court found that
the proviso would fall short of preserving a union's freedom to appeal to the public if the
proviso applied only to situations in which a union's dispute was with a manufacturer or pro-
cessor. Id. The court held that "producer" has a broader meaning than "manufacturer" or
"processor". Id. at 56.
7 See id. at 55. But see 641 F.2d at 550-52 (McMillian, J., dissenting). The dissent in
Pet contended that Servette supported the protection of all union publicity by the proviso.
See id.
72 See NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 55-56 (1964).
7 See id.
7' See 641 F.2d at 549.
75 Id.
76 See id.; Local 537 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Lohman Sales Co.), 132 N.L.R.B. 901, 907,
48 L.R.R.M. 1429, 1432 (1961).
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Sales interpretation of the publicity proviso." Because Servette distilled
the legislative history of the proviso and adopted the Lohman rationale,
the Supreme Court implicity found that "production," as used in the pro-
viso, required some labor by the primary employer upon the product
that the secondary distributed. 8 In Pet, the Eighth Circuit correctly re-
jected the Board's virtual abandonment of the producer-distributor re-
quirement of the publicity proviso since no labor of the primary
employer, Hussmann, passed through the Pet corporate enterprise into
the products that the secondary employer, Pet, distributed.
7 9
In contrast to the Eighth Circuit's construction of the publicity pro-
viso, the Fourth Circuit in DeBartolo interpreted the proviso simply to
require a mutually beneficial relationship between the parties for the
protection of publicity." The mutually beneficial relationship require-
ment that the Fourth Circuit substituted for the producer-distributor
relationship requirement of the statute represents a novel approach to
interpretation of the proviso and extends protection of the proviso to
publicity beyond the bounds of congressional intent.' In enacting the
publicity proviso, Congress sought to protect union publicity from the
prohibition against secondary activity only when a form of producer-
distributor relationship existed between the union's primary employer
" See NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 55 (1964); Local 537, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters
(Lohman Sales Co.), 132 N.L.R.B. 901, 907, 48 L.R.R.M. 1429, 1432 (1961); see, e.g., Great W.
Broadcasting Corp. v. NLRB, 356 F.2d 434, 436 (9th Cir. 1966) (television advertising ser-
vices constitute labor); Local 54, Sheet Metal Workers (Sakowitz, Inc.), 174 N.L.R.B. 362,
363-64, 70 L.R.R.M. 1215, 1216-17 (1969) (air conditioning installation services form of labor).
"' See NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 55 (1964); Local 537, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters
(Lohman Sales Co.), 132 N.L.R.B. 901, 907, 48 L.R.R.M. 1429, 1432 (1961).
" See 641 F.2d at 549. See also Unions, supra note 3, at 233-35.
The Board and the Pet court did not consider the significance of 9-0-5 Stores' use of
Hussmann refrigeration units. See 641 F.2d at 547 n.2; note 49 supra. The use of the
refrigeration units by a nonindependent division of Pet arguably made Pet a distributor of
Hussmann products. See 641 F.2d at 547 n.2; note 49 supra. The flow of the labor of
Hussmann, however, was not through the corporate enterprise structure; rather,
Hussmann's product passed to 9-0-5 as a purchaser independent from Hussmann. See 641
F.2d at 547 n.2; note 49 supra.
Not recognizing the impact of Pet's use of the Hussmann refrigeration units, the
Eighth Circuit in Pet also properly remanded the case for the Board to determine whether §
8(b)(4) nevertheless protected the publicity. See 641 F.2d at 547. Since Hussmann and Pet
are in a parent-subsidiary relationship, the close relationship of the two possibly could
justify classification of publicity directed at either as primary activity. The two companies
potentially are not separate "persons" for purposes of § 8(b)(4). See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)
(1976); note 1 supra. Section 8(b)(4) does not prohibit any publicity that is primary activity
regardless of a producer-distributor relationship. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976); note 1
supra.
I See 662 F.2d at 269. The DeBartolo court found that the symbiotic relationship be-
tween DeBartolo and the tenants of the mall DeBartolo operated was a relationship suffi-
cient to satisfy the proviso. See id.; text accompanying note 37 supra.
" See 662 F.2d at 269; notes 6 & 37 supra.
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and the secondary employer that the publicity targeted.2 The court's
substitution of the "mutual benefit" requirement for the producer-
distributor requirement of the publicity proviso is an unjustified judicial
expansion of the scope of the proviso. 3 In enacting the proviso, Congress
intended to protect only union appeals to the public that could influence
secondary parties to exert pressure on the union's primary employer.84
Congress did not intend to sanction all secondary publicity activity.85
Congress apparently determined that confining the protection of publicity
to situations in which the primary and secondary employer stand in a
producer-distributor relationship most accurately fulfilled the purpose
of the proviso.8 The producer-distributor requirement of the publicity
proviso was a legislative attempt to confine the protection of the proviso
to situations in which Congress anticipated that the secondary employer
could influence the primary employer. 7 By supplanting the producer-
distributor requirement of the proviso with the "mutual benefit" re-
quirement, the Fourth Circuit simply ignored the congressional intent
and express terms of the proviso.8
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit incorrectly characterized the mall
tenants as distributors of High's products. Under both Lohman Sales
and Servette, some direct labor addition to the product that the secon-
dary employer eventually distributed was required for the secondary
employer's classification as a distributor of a primary employer's pro-
duct. DeBartolo was a distributor of High's products since High's con-
struction labor added value to the mall enterprise that DeBartolo of-
' See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976); note 6 supra.
Congress limited the protection of the publicity proviso to producer-distributor rela-
tionships in order to safeguard a union's ability to influence a primary employer by exerting
publicity pressure on users of the primary employer's product. See NLRB v. Servette, Inc.,
377 U.S. 47, 55 (1964); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 662 F.2d 264, 270 n.4 (4th Cir.
1981); note 6 supra. Congress simultaneously restricted economic injury of a labor dispute to
parties in positions of significant influence. See note 6 supra; cf. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable
Packers & Warehouseman Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 93 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (Congress
balancing right to publicize and limiting effects of communication); 371 U.S. 675, 692 (1951)
(Congress shielding unoffending parties from controversies not their own). Parties in a
producer-distributor relationship are situated so that pressure on the secondary employer
potentially results in meaningful influence on the primary. Under the proviso, a union
lawfully can apply pressure on the primary without subjecting parties who have no mean-
ingful influence on the dispute to costs associated with the dispute.
See 662 F.2d at 269.
105 CONG. REC. 17898 (1959), cited in NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers &
Warehousemen Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 70 (1964) (proviso protects appeals to consumers
since such appeals indirectly can pressure primary employers).
' See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976); 105 CONG. REC. 17898 (1959).
" See 105 CONG. REC. 17898 (1959).
" See id.
" See 662 F.2d at 269; notes 37 & 40 supra.
See 662 F.2d at 269.
"o See NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 55 (1964); Local 537, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters
(Lohman Sales Co.), 132 N.L.R.B. 901, 907, 48 L.R.R.M. 1429, 1432 (1961).
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fered to the public.9' The mall tenants, in contrast, derived only inciden-
tal benefit from High's construction work.92 Therefore, classification of
the mall tenants as distributors of High's products was incorrect.
Though the Fourth Circuit erred in classifying the mall tenants as
distributors of High's products, the court nevertheless correctly found
that the publicity proviso protected the union handbilling at issue in
DeBartolo from the prohibition of section 8(b)(4).93 The handbilling did
not describe the mall tenants' stores as distributors of High's product.
9 4
Instead, the handbilling identified the stores only in relation to the
boycott against DeBartolo.95 The stores formed the mall enterprise that
DeBartolo distributed to the public.96 Since DeBartolo also distributed
the product of the primary employer, High,97 the publicity proviso pro-
tected the handbilling that urged a total boycott of the secondary
employer, DeBartolo, and the mall enterprise that DeBartolo
distributed.98
When considering situations in which a secondary employer
distributes an abstract product, such as the mall enterprise in DeBar-
tolo, to the public, the courts and the Board should confine the protec-
tion of the publicity proviso to the extent that Congress intended when
enacting the proviso.99 The Pet and DeBartolo cases illustrate the
susceptibility of the present language of the proviso to inconsistent con-
struction and the propensity of court and Board opinions construing the
language of the proviso to conflicting interpretations. ' Inconsistent ap-
91 662 F.2d at 269.
See id. The DeBartolo court noted that the mall tenants help distribute the Wilson
store and the store's inventory by attracting shoppers, helping maintain common areas, and
participating in joint advertising with Wilson. Id. The court found that the mall tenants and
DeBartolo distributed the mall enterprise and the goods sold through the enterprise simply
by conducting business. Id.
" See 662 F.2d at 271.
" See id. at 269. The union handbilling in DeBartolo did not describe the mall tenants'
stores as distributors of High's product. See id. at 266-67. Instead, the handbilling identified
the stores only in relation to the boycott against DeBartolo. See id. The stores as a unit
made up the DeBartolo mall enterprise and were products that DeBartolo distributed to the
public. Publicity need not target only the secondary's product that flows from the primary
employer. See NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen Local 760, 377 U.S.
58, 70 (1964). Rather, the publicity can appeal to the public to boycott the secondary
business altogether. See id. Since the mall tenants' stores were products of DeBartolo, and
DeBartolo also distributed a pioducts of the primary employer, High, the publicity proviso
protected the publicity urging a boycott of both DeBartolo and the tenant stores.
"7 See 662 F.2d at 271; note 94 supra.
" See 662 F.2d at 271.
97See id. at 272.
" See id. at 271-72.
" See 105 CONG. REC. 16591 (1959) (implying purpose of proviso to protect appeals to
public for support in labor dispute).
"I Compare Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 662 F.2d at 266, 272 (producer-
distributor requirement of proviso satisfied) with Pet, Inc. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d at 546-47
(producer-distributor requirement of proviso not satisfied).
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plication of the publicity proviso leaves unions unsure of their rights in
disputes in which secondary publicity activity is a viable economic
weapon in the union arsenal. Secondary employers find themselves in
positions of insecurity when they become the target of union publicity.
Congressional action clarifying the coverage of the publicity proviso's
protection would help alleviate the confusion that unions and secondary
employers face when exercising their rights in relation to the publicity
proviso of section 8(b)(4). Congress should act to provide the Board and
the courts with a manageable guide for determining which producer-
distributor relationships deserve the protection of the proviso.
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